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OF DECISIONS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
NICHOLAS A. FROMHERZ

 
ABSTRACT 
Forum non conveniens has been criticized as anachronistic and unfair. 
Critics say that it amounts to little more than economic protectionism, 
serving as a pretext for the dismissal of suits brought against domestic 
corporate defendants. Even if one does not view the doctrine as inherently 
flawed, it is undeniable that its application has been extremely uneven 
owing to the broad discretion exercised by district courts’ ruling on the 
issue. Troubling in any circumstances, the misapplication of forum non 
conveniens is all the more so because of the high stakes at issue in such 
matters. When a case is dismissed for forum non conveniens, it usually 
goes away for good. 
Against this background, I argue that the appellate courts should adopt 
a stricter standard of review for decisions on forum non conveniens. The 
basic rubric (abuse of discretion) should remain, but appellate courts 
should apply this standard with heightened scrutiny in light of the serious 
consequences of the underlying decision. The courts have done so in the 
analogous context of rulings on class certification. Doing so in the context 
of forum non conveniens would significantly curb abuse, all the while 
demonstrating to litigants and the broader community that the judiciary 
understands the importance of these decisions in today’s world.   
 
 
  Visiting Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., University of San Diego 
School of Law; B.A., University of Oregon. This article would not have been possible without the 
support of my loving family. I am also indebted to Joseph Mead and Professor Walter Heiser for their 
helpful comments and critiques of an earlier draft. All errors remain my own.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a shrinking world. With rapid economic globalization and 
technology that defies geography, national boundaries become less 
significant every day. This is all the more true for U.S.-based companies, 
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which find themselves at the vanguard of globalization, making moves in 
all corners of the earth.
1
  
But it is not all profit and progress. As U.S. companies expand their 
international presence,
2
 they frequently cause injuries to foreign citizens. 
Argentines contract HIV through the reckless distribution of blood 
products;
3
 a Ford-owning Mexican is injured in a rollover;
4
 and the list 
goes on. And so with the ascendancy of international commerce, we see a 
corresponding ascendancy in international litigation—with the United 
States as the venue of choice.
5
  
For a number of reasons, foreign plaintiffs want their cases heard in 
U.S. courts and, perhaps counter-intuitively, U.S. defendants prefer to 
resolve matters elsewhere.
6 
In fact, the draw to litigate in the United States 
is so powerful, and the consequences so high, that the issue of location 
frequently overshadows the merits. In legal terms, it all comes down to the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens (―FNC‖). This doctrine permits U.S. 
courts to dismiss lawsuits brought by foreign plaintiffs when the deference 
normally paid to the plaintiff‘s choice of forum is vastly outweighed by 
considerations of convenience.
7
 In theory, FNC dismissals are the 
 
 
 1. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS 
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 131 (2006) (observing that ―the United States, as a 
country, dominates, drives, perpetuates, and disproportionately prospers from the spread of global 
capitalism around the world‖). ―[I]t is barely exaggerating to say that the United States is responsible 
for the worldwide spread of free markets.‖ Id. at 231–32. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the 
United States is alone in this. While the United States may have dominated the world economy for 
most of the twentieth century, India and China have emerged as strong competitors. The United States 
will not become irrelevant in the global economy—so forum non conveniens will continue to be a hot 
issue in the courts—but it will likely share the top spot with its neighbors to the east. See A New World 
Economy: The Balance of Power Will Shift to the East as China and India Evolve, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948401 
.htm.  
 2. John P. Doprovich, Jr., Dismissal Under Forum Non Conveniens: Should the Availability 
Requirement be a Threshold Issue When Applied to Nonessential Defendants, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 
561, 562 (2006) (noting that many U.S. companies do more business with companies based in China 
than they do with their counterparts based in the United States).  
 3. See Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 4. See In re Ford Motor Co., 580 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 5. See Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial 
Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 
141, 142 (1998); see also Lory Barsdate Easton, Getting Out of Dodge: Defense Pointers on 
Jurisdictional Issues in Aviation Torts Litigation, 20 AIR & SPACE L. 9, 9 (2006) (―One very clear 
trend in U.S. products liability litigation over the past several years has been an increase in litigation 
brought by overseas plaintiffs arising from overseas incidents and injuries.‖). 
 6. See discussion infra Part. I.B.2.b.  
 7. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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exception; in practice, however, FNC dismissals seem to have become 
more like the rule.
8
  
One of the reasons for this, the reason I explore in this article, is the 
standard of appellate review. When a federal district court dismisses a case 
on FNC grounds, a federal appellate court reviews that decision for an 
abuse of discretion.
9
 A deferential standard of review in most contexts, it 
is all the more so in FNC cases.
10
 But with so much riding on the 
outcome—an FNC dismissal is usually case-dispositive appellate review 
should be more rigorous. The standard should still be abuse of discretion, 
but it should be more like the abuse of discretion analysis applied in the 
review of class certification decisions. Call it ―abuse-of-discretion-plus.‖ 
To make this argument, I devote Part I to discussing the origins of 
FNC, the governing analytical framework, and the doctrine‘s underlying 
principles. In Part II, I discuss the practical effects of FNC decisions by 
drawing a parallel to decisions on class certification. In Part III, I discuss 
the standard of appellate review for FNC decisions. I observe that while 
the stakes are similar to class certification rulings and the standard of 
review is ostensibly the same (abuse of discretion), appellate courts 
actually give much more deference to district court decisions concerning 
FNC. I substantiate the point through an empirical analysis. Finally, in 
Part IV, I press my central thesis: Appellate courts should apply the same 
rigorous version of abuse of discretion review to decisions on FNC that 
they apply to rulings on class certification. This would be in better 
harmony with the driving principles of the FNC doctrine and the high 
stakes of the issue.  
I. A PRIMER ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
In this part, I discuss the history and evolution of FNC, the test as it 
currently stands, the doctrine‘s driving principles, and problems in 
practice. Through this discussion, we come to see that while FNC was 
designed to prevent abuses in venue selection, it has become a tool that 
 
 
 8. Compare Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (―[The] doctrine of 
forum non conveniens proceed[s] from [the] premise [that]: [i]n rare circumstances, federal courts can 
relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.‖), with Michael T. Lii, An Empirical 
Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 526 (2009) (finding that courts have granted more than 50% of these motions 
since 1982).  
 9. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994). 
 10. See Michael Greenberg, The Forum Non Conveniens Motion and the Death of the Moth: A 
Defense Perspective in the Post-Sinochem Era, 72 ALB. L. REV. 321, 334 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/1
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courts aggressively use to dismiss cases that plaintiffs have legitimately 
filed in the United States. In practice, FNC does its job too well.  
A. History and Evolution 
Like so many judicial doctrines, it is difficult to pin down the exact 
time and place of FNC‘s origin. The general consensus, however, is that 
Scottish courts first developed the doctrine in the nineteenth century.
11
 
Then, as now, courts used FNC to prevent abuses in venue selection—
where the alternative forum was in a different country and the plaintiff 
chose Scotland simply to harass the defendant through a distant and 
inconvenient forum.
12
 As the doctrine gained permanence in the British 
Isles, American state courts picked it up as well. Though they rarely used 
the term forum non conveniens, that was, in substance, exactly the doctrine 
they were applying.
13
 By the early 1900s, the concept (if not the term) was 
an accepted feature of common law in most state courts.
14
  
In the federal courts though, a definitive statement on FNC would not 
come until 1947. That year saw the Supreme Court‘s decision in Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert,
15
 still one of the two most important cases in FNC 
jurisprudence. In Gilbert, the Court held that a district court has the 
inherent power to dismiss an action for FNC despite proper jurisdiction.
16
 I 
will set forth the modern FNC test in a moment, but for now it suffices to 
note that Gilbert made a pair of lasting contributions: (1) the initial 
presumption that a plaintiff‘s choice of forum is entitled to deference;17 
and (2) the need to weigh both ―public‖ and ―private‖ factors in 
determining whether that presumption is overcome by practical 
inconvenience.
18
  
But Gilbert was still a step removed from the scenario we are 
concerned with in this article—that of international litigation. The plaintiff 
 
 
 11. See Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 449; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 
(1981); Thomas R. Anderson, American Dredging Co. v. Miller: Clouding the Waters of Maritime 
Litigation, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (1996). 
 12. Edward Greer Hardwicke, Federal Courts—Application of Forum Non Conveniens Rule, 26 
TEX. L. REV. 218, 218–19 (1947).  
 13. See J. Stanton Hill, Note, Towards Global Convenience, Fairness, and Judicial Economy: An 
Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Before Determining 
Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1177, 1183 (2008).  
 14. Hardwicke, supra note 12, at 219. 
 15. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 16. Id. at 502–09, 512. 
 17. See id. at 508 (―[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff‘s 
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.‖). 
 18. Id. at 508–09. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in Gilbert was a Virginia citizen who sued a Pennsylvania corporation in 
the Southern District of New York.
19
 It was not until 1981, in Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, that the Supreme Court would speak on FNC in 
cases involving foreign plaintiffs.
20
  
The core set of facts in Piper—a foreign citizen injured abroad by a 
product designed and manufactured in the United States
21—is one we see 
over and over in modern FNC cases. Along with Gilbert, it is the other 
giant of FNC jurisprudence. But the Piper Court did not merely apply the 
principles of Gilbert to an international case. Rather, it adjusted the 
doctrine in two important ways. First, the Court added a preliminary test to 
protect a plaintiff whose home nation lacks any meaningful system of 
justice.
22
 If the alternative forum is not ―available‖ and ―adequate,‖ the 
analysis stops right there and the case stays with the U.S. court.
23
 But as 
we shall see, this is scant protection in most cases; unless the alternative 
forum is truly horrendous, it will clear this hurdle.
24
 And, if the Court‘s 
first adjustment nevertheless seems pro-plaintiff, the second adjustment 
tips the scale in favor of defendants. After announcing the ―available and 
adequate‖ threshold test, the Court held that a foreign plaintiff‘s choice of 
forum may be accorded less deference by U.S. courts than that enjoyed by 
domestic plaintiffs.
25
 Even if the Court did not intend it, this skews the 
whole analysis going forward, coloring each of the public and private 
factors in defendants‘ favor.26  
 
 
 19. Id. at 502–03.  
 20. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).  
 21. Id. at 238. With the decline in U.S. manufacturing over the last few decades, however, 
today‘s FNC cases are less likely to hinge on that factor. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Howard J. Shatz, 
Trade and Jobs in U.S. Manufacturing, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 2 (1994) 
(describing ―the sharp decline of overall employment in manufacturing‖). The jurisdictional ―hook‖ is 
more likely to be a U.S.-based design, in the case of a product, or, in the case of a service, a U.S.-based 
service team.  
 22. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. 
 23. Id.; In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1164 (5th Cir. 1987).  
 24. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying 
Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2005) (―The ‗adequate 
alternative forum‘ prerequisite rarely prevents a United States court from granting a forum non 
conveniens motion.‖); Finity E. Jernigan, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and 
Justice?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81 (2008) (―By failing to consider what realistically will or will 
not occur in an alternative forum, courts misapply the forum non conveniens test and in so doing 
neglect their unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction with which they are entrusted.‖).  
 25. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (―[T]he presumption applies with less 
force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.‖). 
 26. These are not the only important contributions of Piper. See In re Factor VIII or IX 
Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2007) (―The other important point 
Piper Aircraft made was that a dismissal based on forum non conveniens that is otherwise appropriate 
should not ordinarily be rejected just because it would lead to a change in applicable law unfavorable 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/1
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B. The Basic Test, Underlying Principles, and Practical Problems 
In this part, I describe the basic test and underlying principles of FNC. 
Then I discuss the problems of FNC in practice, including the presumption 
against foreign plaintiffs, practical and procedural considerations that 
enable early dismissal, and the lenient standard of appellate review. 
1. The Test and Underlying Principles 
As the Court recently confirmed in Sinochem Int’l Co., Ltd. v. 
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.,27 the Piper and Gilbert decisions set the 
basic rules for courts deciding motions to dismiss on FNC. On paper, the 
test is simple enough. A court starts with the presumption that the chosen 
forum is appropriate, and the defendant therefore bears a ―heavy burden‖ 
in moving for dismissal on FNC.
28
 But the defendant‘s burden is not that 
heavy when it faces off against a foreign plaintiff, as the presumption in 
the plaintiff‘s favor applies ―with less force‖ when the plaintiff sues away 
from her home country.
29
 More on this later.  
Nonetheless, to achieve dismissal, the defendant must show the 
existence of an alternative forum that is both ―available‖ and ―adequate.‖30 
―An alternative forum is ‗available‘ if all of the parties are amenable to 
process and within the forum‘s jurisdiction.‖31 Adequacy is met ―when the 
parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though 
they might not enjoy the same benefits as they might receive in an 
American court.‖32  
 
 
to the plaintiff. Only if ‗the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or 
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all‘ should the unfavorable change be given substantial—or even 
dispositive—weight.‖ (internal citation omitted) (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254)). 
 27. Sinochem Int‘l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 28. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 423; Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 70–71 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 29. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 423 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 255–56) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 30. Stroitelstvo Bulg. Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enter. Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
 31. Stroitelstvo, 589 F.3d at 421. 
 32. Saqui v. Pride Cent. Am., LLC, 595 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 731 (4th Cir. 2010); see also In re Factor VIII or IX 
Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2007) (―An alternative forum is 
adequate when the parties will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly.‖ (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1393 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); cf. Dole Food 
Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (―A foreign forum is adequate when it provides 
the plaintiff with a sufficient remedy for his wrong.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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If an adequate alternative forum exists, the district court then considers 
whether an FNC dismissal ―would serve the private interests of the parties 
and the public interests of the alternative forums.‖33 The private-interest 
factors include  
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive.
34
  
A court may also consider the enforceability of the judgment if one is 
obtained.
35
 The public-interest factors, in contrast, include the 
administrative difficulties stemming from court congestion, the local 
interest in having localized disputes decided at home, the interest in 
having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is comfortable with the 
law that must govern the action, the avoidance of unnecessary problems in 
conflicts of laws or in the application of foreign law, and the unfairness of 
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
36
 
True to its name, then, FNC is all about convenience. Though 
―[d]ismissal for forum non conveniens reflects a court‘s assessment of a 
range of considerations,‖ the ―most notabl[e]‖ among them is ―the 
convenience to the parties and the practical difficulties that can attend the 
adjudication of a dispute in a certain locality.‖37 As it was for the Scottish 
 
 
 33. Stroitelstvo, 589 F.3d at 424. 
 34. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
 35. Id.  
 36. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09. The issue of a U.S. court applying foreign law is a complicated 
one. On the one hand, the Court in Piper held that it is legitimate for a plaintiff to choose a U.S. forum 
to avoid unfavorable law if the foreign law deprives the plaintiff of all remedies or treats her unfairly. 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1981). On the other hand, courts may properly 
consider the application of foreign law as a factor favoring dismissal. In the end though, the 
jurisprudence is clear that this should not be seen as dispositive. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 
F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1970) (―[T]he mere fact that the court is called upon to determine and apply 
foreign law does not present a legal problem of the sort which would justify the dismissal of a case 
otherwise properly before the court.‖); Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 901, 910 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (―[E]ven were the choice of law analysis to favor application of [foreign] law, this 
would not suffice to mandate forum non conveniens dismissal.‖). 
 37. Sinochem Int‘l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007) (citations 
omitted) (quoting another source); see also UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 
F.3d 210, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (―The focus of the analysis is on convenience, and the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that Texas was a more convenient forum.‖); Mercier v. 
Sheraton Int‘l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 428–29 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that decisions on FNC should 
―serve the norms of increased convenience and efficiency underlying the forum non conveniens 
doctrine‖); Perry S. Granof, Richard F. Hans, Samaa A.F. Haridi & Jennifer S. Kozar, Ebb and Flow: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/1
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courts that founded the doctrine, U.S. courts applying FNC dismiss cases 
not for want of jurisdiction but to promote efficient litigation.
38
 If the case 
could be more conveniently—more efficiently—tried in another forum, 
the doctrine should facilitate that. On paper, it does.  
2. Problems in Practice 
In practice, FNC fails to promote consistently efficient outcomes.
39
 If 
we measure efficiency in the administration of justice by the speed, cost, 
and fairness of case resolution, FNC often comes up short. The fact of the 
matter is that forums labeled ―alternative‖ and ―adequate‖ rarely exist in 
reality. Cases dismissed on FNC seem to just disappear.
40
 They may go 
away efficiently, but they are not resolved efficiently—at least not through 
adjudication or settlement on reasonable terms.  
Why is it, then, that application of FNC often gives way to inefficient 
results? Why does it fail to serve the ends of convenience and justice as 
supposedly intended? There are three related reasons: (1) an approach by 
district courts tending to give negative deference to a foreign plaintiff‘s 
choice of forum (i.e., the assumption is not that the forum was chosen for a 
legitimate reason, but that it was in fact chosen for an illegitimate reason); 
(2) practical considerations and a procedural rule that encourage early 
FNC decisions; and (3) a lenient brand of abuse of discretion review that 
tends to uphold questionable FNC dismissals on appeal. These dynamics 
create a vicious circle wherein district courts render suspect decisions, 
 
 
The Changing Jurisdictional Tides of Global Litigation, 21 N.Y. INT‘L L. REV. 53, 63 (2008) (―[A] 
court may dismiss . . . claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, even where certain or all 
benefits unique to the U.S. legal system will no longer be available to the plaintiff or the plaintiff may 
otherwise be harmed by a change in applicable law, so long as an adequate alternative forum exists 
and dismissal would promote both convenience and justice.‖).  
 38. See Brown v. Cartwright, 20 SCOT. L.R. 818 (1883); Societe du Gaz de Paris v. Societe 
Anonyme du Navigation ―Les Armateurs Francais,‖ 1925 Sess. Cas. 332, aff’d, 1926 Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 
13; Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 448 (1994); Joel H. Samuels, When is an Alternative 
Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1060 (2010) 
(―When applied properly, forum non conveniens can be useful in ensuring that private and public 
resources are efficiently managed in the context of litigation involving foreign parties on one or both 
sides of a case.‖); Greg Vanden-Eykel, Convenience for Whom? When Does Appellate Discretion 
Supersede a Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum?, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 307, 310 (2010) 
(―The doctrine of forum non conveniens originated as a common law method to improve judicial 
efficiency and effectiveness by providing justices with the discretionary power to decline jurisdiction 
where they reasonably believe that another forum is more appropriate.‖). 
 39. See Samuels, supra note 38, at 1060 (―[T]he present test for forum non conveniens—as set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Piper and as interpreted by lower courts—creates confusion and 
uncertainty in application. That confusion, which results from an unclear test that is unevenly 
enforced, undermines the legitimacy and accountability of the federal courts.‖). 
 40. See infra Part II. 
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appellate courts uphold them without or despite questioning them, and, 
because the decisions are upheld, district courts have no real incentive to 
change course.  
Before diving into specifics, however, let‘s keep in mind the big 
picture. District court judges and their staffs are overworked.
41
 They want 
to do a good job with every case assigned, but without a fairly aggressive 
approach to dismissing cases that can be dismissed, the numbers often do 
not permit it.
42
 Judges have a very real and legitimate incentive to manage 
their docket—to keep their caseload at a reasonable level—because 
(a) they want to give the cases they do adjudicate the attention they 
deserve, and (b) they do not have the time or resources available to timely 
adjudicate every case that is filed. The end result is a bias towards 
dismissal.
43
 This bias may be subconscious, but it exists nonetheless.
44
 
 
 
 41. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Corporate Cooperation Through Cost-Sharing, 16 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 109, 130 (2009) (―District court dockets are more overburdened than 
ever. Between 1997 and 2006, U.S. district courts experienced an 11% increase in the number of 
pending cases.‖ (citation omitted)); Tal Kedeem, Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent 
Infringement: Which Inventions Pave the Road?, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2007) 
(―District courts are generally overworked . . . .‖). 
 42. See Michael M. Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and 
the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 327, 341 (2003) (―If the judiciary, a system 
with limited resources, [did] not discriminate between disputes so that only those issues that are 
properly connected to the local interests are litigated before the local courts, justice might not be done 
in any [case].‖). 
 43. See David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object 
Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 353, 357 (1994) (―[J]udges are quite likely to 
proclaim their fearsome workloads as a principal basis for granting forum non conveniens 
dismissals.‖); Emily J. Derr, Striking a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 819, 827 (2008) (―District court judges are also subject to the ‗understandable 
temptation‘ to grant dismissals to reduce docket congestion. . . .  Refusing to adjudicate only because a 
given case would be difficult or time consuming is plainly illegitimate. . . . Unfortunately, the doctrine 
[of FNC] as currently formulated and applied provides and, indeed, promotes inappropriate 
justifications for dismissal.‖ (internal citations omitted)). But see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 337 (3d ed. 1996) (―In general, the forum‘s docket has 
not played a decisive role in forum non conveniens analysis.‖).  
 This bias towards dismissal plays out in many contexts, including motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6). This is all the more true after Twombly and Iqbal. As one commentator noted, ―in cases 
where the new standard can make a difference, it almost certainly will, with district courts severely 
overburdened and often operating without a full complement of judges.‖ Rakesh N. Kilaru, The New 
Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 920 n.101 
(2010). Or, as Professor Robert Bone put it: 
The major impact of Twombly—and I believe the reason critics are so concerned—is not so 
much what it says about the pleading standard, but rather what it says about discovery costs 
and settlement leverage as well as the ineffectiveness of case management more generally. 
This portion of the opinion, coupled with the Court‘s explicit endorsement of case screening 
as an appropriate pleading function, might be interpreted by overburdened district judges as 
an invitation to use the vague ―plausibility‖ standard aggressively, notwithstanding language 
in Twombly and later in Erickson to the contrary. In other words, critics fear that Twombly 
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Although choice of law is not supposed to be a dispositive factor in the 
analysis, the prospect of applying foreign law understandably gives 
overworked courts even more reason to apply FNC vigorously.
45
  
a. A Presumption Against Foreign Plaintiffs 
The Supreme Court in Piper held that, although a plaintiff‘s choice of 
forum is normally entitled to a ―strong presumption‖ of legitimacy, that 
―presumption applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties in 
interest are foreign.‖46 On its face, this language suggests that a foreign 
plaintiff‘s choice still deserves some deference, just less deference than 
that accorded to the choice made by a domestic plaintiff. With domestic 
plaintiffs, in other words, it is fair for courts to assume that the forum has 
been chosen for reasons of convenience.
47
 ―When the plaintiff is foreign, 
however, this assumption is much less reasonable.‖48  
Fair enough. The district court entertaining a suit by a foreign plaintiff 
should not assume that the plaintiff filed in the United States for reasons of 
convenience, but it should question that election through a more rigorous 
application of the FNC analysis.
49
 But because the choice of forum is still 
 
 
gives too much latitude to district judges, who are eager to screen cases and likely to read the 
opinion as granting permission to do so. 
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 
889 (2009) (citations omitted).  
 44. Another problem worth mentioning is the fact that a district court may raise FNC sua sponte. 
Though this rarely happens in practice since defendants can be counted on to raise the issue where 
colorable, it is a troubling facet of the law. Emily J. Derr, Striking a Better Public-Private Balance in 
Forum Non Conveniens, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 819, 837–38 (2008). 
 45. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying 
Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1178 (2005) (―From the trial 
court‘s perspective, the fact that it will face a choice-of-law determination and that the court may end 
up applying foreign law, makes granting the defendant‘s forum non conveniens motion an attractive 
option.‖); Derr, supra note 43, at 826–27 (―For a variety of reasons, forum non conveniens dismissals 
are uniquely attractive to judges. For example, forum non conveniens issues arise in federal court 
almost exclusively in cases involving a foreign party. Judges can therefore often avoid complex 
conflict-of-laws questions and the burdens of applying foreign law by granting forum non conveniens 
dismissals.‖ (citations omitted)).  
 46. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). 
 47. Id at 255–56.  
 48. Id. at 256. 
 49. The Seventh Circuit has explained the theory quite well: 
[W]hen the plaintiff has sued in his or her home forum, there is a strong presumption in favor 
of that choice. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56 (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)). Under those circumstances, ―A defendant invoking 
forum non conveniens . . . bears a heavy burden in opposing the plaintiff‘s chosen forum.‖ 
Sinochem Int‘l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007). 
Conversely, if the plaintiff is suing far from home, it is less reasonable to assume that the 
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entitled to some deference, the suit should stay in the United States if the 
FNC factors balance evenly. That is, the choice of forum should at least 
serve as a tie-breaker in favor of the plaintiff where the other factors 
balance.
50
 This does not happen. 
Instead, failing to recognize that ―this reduced weight ‗is not an 
invitation to accord a foreign plaintiff‘s selection of an American forum no 
deference since dismissal for forum non conveniens is the exception rather 
than the rule,‘‖51 many courts automatically apply this diminished or 
negative deference any time a suit is brought by a foreign citizen.
52
 The 
Seventh Circuit‘s 2008 decision in Clerides v. Boeing Co. illustrates the 
point.
53
 The plaintiffs in that case were the representatives of passengers 
who died in a flight from Cyprus to Greece.
54
 Although the plane was 
operated by a Cyprian corporation, a government investigation faulted 
both the airline crew and the manufacturer of the plane, U.S. defendant 
Boeing.
55
 As the plaintiffs sued Boeing on a theory of products liability, 
much of the evidence relevant to the claim was admittedly in Boeing‘s 
 
 
forum is a convenient one and therefore ―the presumption in the plaintiff‘s favor ‗applies with 
less force . . . .‘‖ Id. (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 266). Put the other way, the risk that 
the chosen forum really has little connection to the litigation is greater. We do not understand 
this as any kind of bias against foreign plaintiffs. That would be inconsistent with many 
treaties the United States has signed as well as with the general principle that our courts are 
open to all who seek legitimately to use them. It is instead a practical observation about 
convenience. A citizen of Texas who decided to sue in the federal court in Alaska might face 
an equally skeptical court, which might conclude that convenience requires a change in venue 
under the federal statutory counterpart to forum non conveniens, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 955–56 (7th Cir. 2007). This 
makes perfect sense. Unfortunately, it does not appear to shake out this way in practice. A Texan suing 
in federal court in Alaska will face a judge accustomed to applying the law of another state. The judge 
may still transfer the case to another venue, but the prospect of applying another state‘s law is less 
likely to inspire action than the thought of applying the law of a foreign country; the notion that the 
plaintiff is engaging in improper forum shopping is less likely to crop up in the Texan-in-Alaska case, 
and so forth.  
 50. Gilbert  reiterated, after all, that ―unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the 
plaintiff‘s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.‖ Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 
(1947). 
 51. R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Lacey v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 45–46 (3d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (―[The]doctrine of 
forum non conveniens proceed[s] from [the] premise [that]: [i]n rare circumstances, federal courts can 
relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.‖). 
 52. See Samuels, supra note 38, at 1071; see also Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 
72 (2d. Cir. 2001) (―In our recent cases, we vacated dismissals for forum non conveniens because we 
believed that the district courts had misapplied the basic rules, apparently assuming that deference is 
given to the plaintiff‘s choice of forum only when the plaintiff sues in the plaintiff‘s home district.‖).  
 53. Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 625–26. 
 55. Id. at 626–27, 629. 
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possession and located in the United States.
56
 That notwithstanding, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss because Boeing agreed to 
make the evidence available in Cyprus or Greece.
57
 Although the court 
ostensibly acknowledged the ―deference that is due to the plaintiffs‘ choice 
of forum,‖58 the opinion shows that, in fact, it gave no deference at all to 
that choice. The court used the statement from Piper—that the 
presumption in favor of the plaintiff‘s chosen forum applies with less force 
when the plaintiff is foreign—to erode any deference to the vanishing 
point.
59
 Even when the foreign plaintiff sues in the very district where the 
defendant resides or much of the evidence is located, as was the case in 
Clerides, courts have shown themselves willing to second-guess that 
judgment in their FNC analysis.
60
 We do not see this treatment in cases 
involving domestic plaintiffs.
61
  
 
 
 56. Id. at 629. 
 57. See id. at 629–30. 
 58. Id. at 630. 
 59. See Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 60. Many commentators have expressed frustration with this phenomenon. Diminished deference 
to the forum choice of foreign plaintiffs may be justified, but a complete lack of deference—or 
negative deference—is illogical at best and biased at worst.  
When an American party sues another American party in a federal court, at least one thing is 
certain: so long as some court in the United States has jurisdiction (personal and subject 
matter) over the case, the case will be heard here. By contrast, when foreign parties are 
involved in litigation in a federal court, whether as plaintiffs, defendants, or both, there is no 
such guarantee, even where the federal court is properly seized of jurisdiction (personal and 
subject matter). While this result may at first appear intuitively obvious, the impact of this 
result on litigation in the United States—and the resulting policy making role of courts in this 
process—raises substantial concerns. If a court is properly seized of jurisdiction, why should 
the parties‘ nationality matter? And, if it does matter, why should the courts be making 
decisions on this issue when Congress has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to 
legislate in this arena? More narrowly, if a foreign plaintiff sues an American defendant in the 
district where the defendant resides, should there not be a presumption that the case should be 
heard there?  
See Samuels, supra note 38, at 1059–60.  
 61. See Keeton v. Hustler Mag. Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (stating that a domestic plaintiff‘s 
―successful search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no different from the litigation 
strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules or 
sympathetic local populations‖); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical 
Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 
21 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 38 (1996) (―Subtle bias against foreigners in the adjudicatory process can be 
seen even in some rather mundane procedural law. For example, in the law of venue, although citizens 
are afforded very specific protections with respect to where they can be sued, Congress specifically 
provided that ‗[a]n alien may be sued in any district‘ in the United States.‖ (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(d) (1988))). Note, however, that the statute cited by Professor Johnson has since been 
amended. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (―[A] natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that 
person is domiciled.‖).  
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Presumptions are just that: presumptions, or rules of thumb, based on 
experience that generally guide us in the right direction. If the purpose of 
FNC is to screen out cases where proceeding ―in the chosen forum would 
establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all 
proportion to plaintiff‘s convenience,‖62 then this rule of thumb makes 
some sense. In the run of cases, it is more likely that a domestic 
jurisdiction has less of a connection to a controversy when it is brought by 
a foreign plaintiff as opposed to a resident of the United States. When in 
doubt, then, it makes sense to rely on the presumption. The problem arises 
when district courts use the presumption not as a rule of thumb—taken 
with a grain of salt and doubled-checked to ensure that it makes sense in a 
given case—but as a crutch to avoid deeper analysis. In modern practice, 
many view FNC as nothing more than protectionism by another name.
63
 
 
 
 It is also worth noting that, even if the Piper court did contemplate automatically diminished 
deference for the forum choice of a foreign plaintiff, the rationale may be obsolete. Piper was decided 
in 1982. Since then, the global economy has dramatically changed the contact and interaction foreign 
citizens have with the United States and U.S. companies. Although it may still be more convenient for 
a foreign plaintiff to sue in his home country, courts should be less ready to assume that a foreign 
plaintiff has chosen the United States for illegitimate reasons (whatever those may be).  
 Apart from the question of how strongly the presumption in favor of the chosen forum applies 
even when it applies with full force, moreover, there is also the issue of when to take it down a notch. 
Does a Floridian suing in U.S. District Court in California get the full presumption, the same as, say, a 
Montanan suing in Montana‘s federal court? Trickier still, does the presumption ―apply with less 
force‖ in equal measure to a Russian suing in federal court in Texas as opposed to a Mexican doing the 
same? In many cases—think about foreign plaintiffs living in border towns, to name just one 
example—the foreign plaintiff and her litigation will have a stronger connection to the jurisdiction of 
choice than many cases brought by domestic plaintiffs. The presumption should probably take the 
form of a sliding scale, but that is not what we see. Instead, courts place all domestic plaintiffs in one 
hopper and all foreign plaintiffs in another. But see In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products 
Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2007) (―A citizen of Texas who decided to sue in the federal court 
in Alaska might face an equally skeptical court, which might conclude that convenience requires a 
change in venue under the federal statutory counterpart to forum non conveniens, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).‖). This one-size-fits-all-approach is not in keeping with the underlying policy of FNC and 
the reality of globalization; the earth is shrinking, yes, but citizens of some nations tend to have a 
closer connection and more interaction with the United States than others.  
 62. Sinochem Int‘l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007).  
 63. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680–81 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, 
J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Doggett lambasted his dissenting colleagues for refusing to 
recognize FNC for what it really is—economic protectionism of U.S.-based companies. Doggett wrote 
as follows: 
To accomplish the desired social engineering, [the dissenters] must invoke yet another legal 
fiction with a fancy name to shield alleged wrongdoers, the so-called doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. The refusal of a Texas corporation to confront a Texas judge and jury is to be 
labeled ―inconvenient‖ when what is really involved is not convenience but connivance to 
avoid corporate accountability. 
 The dissenters are insistent that a jury of Texans be denied the opportunity to evaluate the 
conduct of a Texas corporation concerning decisions it made in Texas because the only ones 
allegedly hurt are foreigners. Fortunately Texans are not so provincial and narrow-minded as 
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―Critics of the forum non conveniens doctrine charge that it is used by U.S. 
corporations as a tool to escape liability when they are sued in U.S. courts 
for injuries caused [abroad].‖64 After looking past all of the legal jargon, it 
is hard to disagree.
65
  
b. Practical and Procedural Considerations that Enable Early 
Dismissal 
Apart from the tendency of district courts to give less than due weight 
to a foreign plaintiff‘s choice of forum, practical and a recent procedural 
development encourage courts to address FNC right out of the gate. In 
turn, early assessment of FNC tends to encourage dismissal because 
district courts are more likely to toss a case in which they have invested 
little time or effort.
66
  
When an attorney contemplates filing a motion, she must consider 
three main factors: (1) the likelihood of success;
67
 (2) the magnitude of the 
 
 
these dissenters presume. Our citizenry recognizes that a wrong does not fade away because 
its immediate consequences are first felt far away rather than close to home. Never have we 
been required to forfeit our membership in the human race in order to maintain our proud 
heritage as citizens of Texas. 
 The dissenters argue that it is inconvenient and unfair for farmworkers allegedly 
suffering permanent physical and mental injuries, including irreversible sterility, to seek 
redress by suing a multinational corporation in a court three blocks away from its world 
headquarters and another corporation, which operates in Texas this country‘s largest chemical 
plant. Because the ―doctrine‖ they advocate has nothing to do with fairness and convenience 
and everything to do with immunizing multinational corporations from accountability for 
their alleged torts causing injury abroad, I write separately.  
Id. (citation omitted). See also Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The 
Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2005) 
(―Those who favor the doctrine argue that forum non conveniens dismissals are necessary to protect 
United States companies doing business overseas from ruinous damage awards, particularly in 
products liability and mass tort actions.‖).  
 64. RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL 
PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 129 
(2007).  
 65. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the courts are in cahoots with domestic corporate 
defendants. Few would argue that the courts intend to apply FNC in such a way that corporate 
defendants are immunized from serious damage awards (assuming a legitimate case). Economic 
protectionism is not the intent; too often, however, it is the result. See id. Similarly, I do not believe the 
courts intend to discriminate against foreign plaintiffs. This is simply the result of FNC being applied 
too liberally—the courts appear to be favoring domestic litigants, and appearances count.  
 66. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Action is an Action is an Action is an Action, 77 WASH. L. REV. 
65, 127 (2002) (explaining that motions to dismiss are usually addressed in the early stages of 
litigation and ―even though a motion for voluntary dismissal apparently may be made at any time, it is 
more likely to be granted if made ‗at an early stage of the case, before much has happened and only 
limited resources have been invested‘‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67. See Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the 
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 523 (2009) (―[A] defendant 
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outcome in the event of a favorable ruling;
68
 and (3) the cost of filing the 
motion.
69
 In the case of a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds, all three of 
these factors play into defense counsel‘s hands. As the statistics show, 
FNC dismissal motions reflect a high rate of success: since 1982, 
approximately 52% of these motions have been granted.
70
 And when these 
motions are granted, the result is usually a complete knockout.
71
 Unlike 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which often produce only 
superficial victories due to ready opportunities to amend, victory on FNC 
yields a complete dismissal.
72
 The case is out of the original forum for 
good and, as I discuss below, usually will not be heard in any forum.
73
  
So the benefits of filing an FNC motion are substantial. But what about 
the costs? Do FNC motions require mounds of discovery, prompting 
defense attorneys to think twice? Not at all.
74
 In comparison to other 
motions achieving similar results, such as motions for summary judgment 
and motions for class certification, preparing an FNC motion is relatively 
cheap.
 
Although ―[e]xtensive discovery may be necessary to adjudicate the 
question of convenience properly,‖75 the limited nature of the inquiry 
means that the discovery will be small in comparison to the discovery 
necessary for summary judgment or class certification in a similarly sized 
case.
76
 Again, an FNC motion stand out as a very attractive alternative.  
 
 
may seek a forum non conveniens dismissal only if he or she thinks that the probability of success is 
high enough.‖). 
 68. A risk-neutral actor will always consider magnitude when making a decision under 
uncertainty. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation Costs, 91 
VA. L. REV. 1721, 1724 n.4 (―Risk neutrality is a standard assumption to make about decisionmaking 
under uncertainty. The assumption captures in a very tractable form the notion that both the probability 
and the magnitude of outcomes matter to decisions.‖).  
 69. Lii, supra note 8, at 523–24 (discussing the effects of uncertainty and information asymmetry 
with regard to the adequacy of an alternative forum as these factors relate to the costs and likelihood of 
settlement or FNC motion filing).  
 70. Id. at 526.  
 71. See infra Part II. The importance of forum is underscored by the fact that almost all 
international commercial contracts contain a forum-selection clause. 
 72. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) 
(―A forum non conveniens dismissal usually will end the litigation altogether, effectively excusing any 
liability of the defendant.‖). 
 73. See infra Part II. For a good overview of the case-dispositive nature of FNC, see generally 
David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction”, 
103 L.Q. REV. 398, 420 (1987). 
 74. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 335 (comparing the discovery necessary for a FNC motion 
to dismiss to that necessary for a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).  
 75. Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 676 (1992) (emphasis added).  
 76. See, e.g., Vivendi, S.A. v. T-Mobile, U.S.A., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28710, at *6 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 18, 2007) (―A motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens does not generally warrant 
detailed development of the case through discovery,‖ and holding that the objecting plaintiff could 
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This is all the more true after the decision in Sinochem. In Sinochem, 
the Supreme Court held that a district court need not determine jurisdiction 
(either personal or subject-matter) if it determines that the case should be 
dismissed on FNC grounds.
77
 ―With such a directive at hand, preliminary 
discovery for determining non-merits dismissals has greatly been 
reduced.‖78 Although the need for factual investigation may not be 
eliminated entirely, ―discovery can be initiated and limited solely to the 
forum non conveniens issue . . . .‖79 For courts and defendants alike, an 
FNC motion is a quick and easy way to dismiss a case.
80
  
c. Lenient Appellate Review 
If misunderstanding of Piper has increased the likelihood that a court 
will grant a motion to dismiss on FNC grounds—and if practical 
considerations and the Sinochem rule have encouraged defendants to file 
motions early and often—then lenient appellate review completes the 
circle by increasing the likelihood that questionable FNC decisions will 
survive on appeal. I explain the nature of this review in more detail below.  
II. FNC AND CLASS CERTIFICATION: PROCEDURAL ISSUES THAT 
OVERSHADOW THE MERITS  
Like many trial courts, the federal district court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan has a local rule that applies only to ―dispositive‖ motions.81 
Because these motions are more important than non-dispositive motions, 
like motions to compel discovery, parties opposing them are given more 
time to prepare a response.
82
 This is not particularly remarkable; what is 
interesting, however, is the list of motions that qualify as dispositive. 
 
 
―pursue discovery . . . narrowly tailored to the question of forum non conveniens—i.e. the events and 
evidence in the United States implicated by this dispute.‖).  
 77. Sinochem Int‘l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int‘l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435–36 (2007).  
 78. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 333. 
 79. Id.  
 80. This is true in most but not all cases. A number of Latin American countries maintain 
―blocking statutes.‖ These statutes are rooted in civil law principles and provide that once a plaintiff 
sues in a court with jurisdiction, all other courts lose jurisdiction. Thus, if the proposed ―alternative‖ 
forum maintains a blocking statute, it ceases to be available and adequate as a matter of law. See 
Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI  INTER-
AM. L. REV. 21, 27 (2004); Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out of the Current Forum Non 
Conveniens Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, 1 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 42, 44 
(2005).  
 81. See E.D. MICH. LR 7.1(e)(1). 
 82. Id.  
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Apart from those expected, such as motions for summary judgment and 
motions for judgment on the pleadings, the list includes motions for class 
certification.
83
  
Under any literal interpretation of the word, these motions cannot be 
considered dispositive. Although a decision one way or the other does not 
technically end the case, labeling them dispositive makes perfect sense 
from a real-world perspective because a decision denying certification is 
often the death knell for a plaintiff, the suit becoming financially 
untenable, and a decision granting certification is the same for a defendant, 
forcing a settlement.
84
 Either way, ―the fight over class certification is 
often the whole ball game.‖85 As explained further in Part III, appellate 
courts have responded to the high stakes of certification decisions by 
reviewing those decisions with heightened scrutiny (albeit under the guise 
of the normally tame abuse of discretion standard). 
Appellate courts have not done this in the context of FNC decisions. 
Yet these decisions are just as case-dispositive as class certification 
rulings.
86
 According to Professor David Robertson, ―[p]retending that such 
dismissals are not outcome-determinative ‗is a rather fantastic fiction.‘‖87 
Conducting a postal survey of eighty-five plaintiffs‘ lawyers whose cases 
 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Ian 
Gallacher, Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past, Present and Future of the Class Action 
Rule in State Court, 58 MD. L. REV. 1510, 1620–21 (1999) (―The class certification decision is 
virtually case dispositive. The denial of class certification, at least of a class certified under provision 
(b)(3), means that many class members will not know that litigation is even possible because class 
notice will not have been sent, and because these members will not have the desire or economic means 
to pursue litigation. . . . . If, on the other hand, the class is certified, then this decision can also have 
negative consequences. The certification order can be used to coerce a defendant into settling litigation 
that may be objectively meritless.‖ (citations omitted)); Gail E. Lees et al., Analysis & Perspective: 
2009: First-Quarter Update on Class Action Trends, 10 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 399, 401 
(Apr. 24, 2009) (reporting that 89% of certified class actions settle); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) Advisory 
Committee‘s Notes accompanying 1998 amendments (―An order denying certification may confront 
the plaintiff with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final 
judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of 
litigation . . . [while] . . . [a]n order granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than 
incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.‖); Jordan L. 
Kruse, Appealability of Class Certification Orders: The “Mandamus Appeal” and a Proposal to 
Amend Rule 23, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 704, 704 (1997) (―The decision whether to certify a class action, 
resting with the sound discretion of the district court judge and made early in the litigation, is of 
paramount importance to the parties to a cause of action.‖ (citations omitted)).  
 85. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Beaver, 466 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 86. See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational 
Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 938 
(1990)  (―The battle over where the litigation occurs is typically the hardest fought and most important 
issue in a transnational case; if the defendant wins this battle, the case is often effectively over.‖).  
 87. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England, supra note 73, at 420.  
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had been dismissed on FNC grounds, Robertson found that the majority 
decided not to file suit abroad or settled for less than 10% of the claim‘s 
estimated value.
88
 ―Thus, the fact is that the forum non conveniens 
dismissal is, in most instances, a dispositive dismissal of the litigation.‖89 
As commentators have explained, attorneys prosecuting cases on behalf of 
foreign plaintiffs place so much emphasis on the chosen U.S. forum that a 
dismissal on FNC grounds, although not on the merits and therefore 
without prejudice to refiling the case in another jurisdiction, usually 
―end[s] any further litigation either domestic or abroad.‖90 Certainly, the 
attorneys bringing FNC motions view them as case-dispositive.
91
  
From the relative ease of discovery in the United States
92
 to the 
availability of jury trials and punitive damages,
93
 attorneys have identified 
a number of factors that compel them to favor litigation in the United 
 
 
 88. Id. at 418–20. Robertson‘s research centered on fifty-five personal injury and thirty 
commercial cases dismissed on FNC grounds between 1947 and 1984. In approximately 49% of the 
personal injury cases and 27% of the commercial cases, the plaintiffs abandoned their cases altogether 
after the FNC dismissal. Merely 18% of the personal injury plaintiffs and 20% of the commercial 
plaintiffs subsequently filed foreign suits. Of the cases actually filed abroad, most were still pending as 
of 1987 and not one plaintiff had won her case. The rest of the cases (i.e., those neither abandoned nor 
filed abroad) were settled, with the defendant generally winning favorable terms at the negotiating 
table. Id.; see also Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. 
INT‘L L.J. 321, 335 (1994) (stating that Robertson‘s results are ―unsurprising,‖ given ―higher costs and 
lower returns abroad‖). Some commentators have suggested that the rate of post-dismissal 
―disappearance‖ may be even higher. See, e.g., Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., Litigation in U.S. Courts of 
Product Liability Cases Arising in Latin America, Panel Talk Before the Miami Conference, Key 
Concepts in Product Liability Law in Latin America Today, in 20 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 47, 93 
(2003) (John F. Molloy ed.) (referencing a study by an Italian law professor who allegedly found that 
―ninety-nine percent of cases dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in the United States, are, for 
one reason or another, never refiled‖).  
 89. Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., supra note 88, at 93 (internal quotations omitted).  
 90. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 332. 
 91. See John Fellas, Strategy in International Litigation, 14 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 317, 320–
21 (2007) (discussing perceived advantages for plaintiffs, and perceived disadvantages for defendants, 
of litigation a case in the United States); see also James Shomper & Gardner Courson, Alternative 
Fees for Litigation: Improved Control and Higher Value, 18 ACCA DOCKET FEATURE 5 (May 2000), 
available at http://www.dupontlegalmodel.com/alternative-fees-for-litigation-improved-control-and-
higher-value/ (identifying a dismissal on FNC grounds as a ―dispositive ruling‖ for purposes of billing 
arrangements).  
 92. See Douglas Seitz, Litigation in U.S. Courts of Product Liability Cases Arising in Latin 
America, Panel Talk before the Miami Conference, Key Concepts in Product Liability Law in Latin 
America Today, 20 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 47, 93 (2003) (John F. Molloy ed.).  
One of the choice-of-law factors that I take into account in considering whether it would be 
better to litigate in the United States versus in the Latin American country is the part that 
discovery will play in the case. Inspection by the defendant of the allegedly offending product 
is usually very easy in the United States and sometimes not as easy in Latin America. 
Id. at 86 (internal quotations omitted).  
 93. John Fellas, Strategy in International Litigation, 14 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 317, 320 
(2007). 
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States.
94
 The advantage is so great that, as Professor Robertson‘s study 
shows, an FNC dismissal will usually end the case.
95
 To put it differently, 
the FNC dismissal rings the death knell just as loudly and clearly as does 
an unfavorable decision on class certification.
96
 And although the courts 
have recognized the practically dispositive nature of FNC decisions as 
well,
97
 the appellate courts have refrained from reviewing such decisions 
for anything beyond normal abuse of discretion.
98
   
 
 
 94. See RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, 
GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS 129 (2007) (―In many cases, it is not forum non conveniens itself that is found offensive 
so much as the fact that its operation denies plaintiffs access to U.S. courts and their liberal discovery 
rules; proximity to the assets of U.S. corporate defendants; perceived higher damage awards; punitive 
damages; jury trials; favorable products liability laws; the contingent fee system; and the lack of a 
loser-pays rule for attorney fees.‖).  
 95. Beyond the empirical evidence, Robertson finds it ―intuitively obvious‖ that a plaintiff 
suffering an FNC dismissal would ―simply surrender‖ rather than ―embark . . . . on an arduous 
journey‖ to litigate in another forum. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England, 
supra note 73, at 418.  
 96. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, The Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction 
on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1183 (2006) (―A forum non conveniens 
dismissal has a significant impact on the outcome of the dispute, in most cases sounding a death knell 
to the plaintiff‘s case.‖); Julius Jurianto, Forum Non Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional 
Dismissals, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 369, 388 (2006) (―[I]n international cases, the harsh 
consequence of the doctrine usually serves as a ‗death knell‘ for the plaintiffs‘ whole action against 
defendants because of the inability of the plaintiffs to go to the hypothesized alternative forum.‖) 
(quoting Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Case 
for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2004)); William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a 
Suit: Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1663, 1690 (1992) (―[A] careful, written opinion is especially important in forum non conveniens cases 
where the death knell of dismissal will sound even though no trial has been held and no decision 
rendered on the merits.‖).  
 97. Vivendi, S.A. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-1524JLR, 2007 WL 1168819 at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007) (―Because it may be dispositive in this case, the court intends to address the issue of 
forum non conveniens before reaching any alterative ground for dismissal.‖); Hill v. Citicorp, 1992 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12605 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding an FNC motion to dismiss to be potentially dispositive—
due to the plaintiffs‘ concession that their allegations failed to state a claim under the laws of the 
alternate available forum—and the equivalent of a ―trial‖ for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 632); Irish Nat‘l 
Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir. 1984) (dismissal on forum non conveniens 
grounds inappropriate where trial in alternate forum will not realistically occur); In re Assicurazioni 
Generali, S.P.A., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (―[P]laintiffs‘ contention that being forced 
to litigate in Europe would be the death knell for their claims may not be an exaggeration.‖); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) (―A forum non 
conveniens dismissal usually will end the litigation altogether, effectively excusing any liability of the 
defendant.‖).  
 98. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
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III. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND WHY IT MATTERS 
So where does the standard of appellate review fit into all of this? As 
suggested above, the standard of appellate review determines the degree to 
which mistakes by trial courts are tolerated.
99
 There are a number of 
reasons why appellate courts grant deference to trial courts—judicial 
economy and stability chief among them
100—but the fact is that appellate 
courts, whenever they apply anything less than de novo review, are 
potentially allowing a mistake of some sort to go uncorrected.
101
 This is 
usually justified by the positive benefits conferred by a deferential 
standard of review. All else being equal, however, the standard of review 
should bear a direct relationship with the importance of the issue on 
appeal. Critical decisions deserve rigorous review; smaller, truly 
discretionary decisions merit something less. The appellate courts have 
applied this understanding in review of class certification decisions. The 
same cannot be said for decisions on FNC.  
A. Abuse of Discretion Review in FNC and Class Certification Appeals 
Abuse of discretion review, the standard that applies in both class 
certification and FNC appeals, comes in different shades.
102
 It is 
―flexible,‖ meaning different things in different contexts.103 For instance, 
although both class certification and FNC appeals are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, appellate review of a decision to deny a continuance will be 
far more deferential than appellate review of a decision granting class 
 
 
 99. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 233, 235 (2009).  
 100. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 
231, 241 (1991) (―Judicial economy requires an appellate court to ‗sign off on a large proportion of the 
decisions a trial court makes, for otherwise it would never be able to get its work done.‘‖ (quoting 
Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Decisions, 79 F.R.D. 173, 181 (1959))).  
 101. See Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial Self-
Restraint in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 73–74 (2009) (―The standard is 
sometimes said to [measure] ‗how wrong‘ the lower court‘s decision must be to warrant reversal. . . . 
In other words, application of a standard that is highly deferential to the lower court‘s decision may 
dictate affirmance of a decision that would have been reversed under a less deferential standard.‖).  
 102. Although abuse of discretion is the predominant standard of review in FNC appeals, this is 
not always the case. The Sixth and Second Circuits have held that de novo review applies when the 
district court decides the FNC motion ―on the purely legal basis that there was no ‗available and 
adequate alternative forum.‘‖ DRFP L.L.C. v. Venezuela, 622 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 
Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1996).  
 103. Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (―Nominally, review of decisions granting or denying class certification is for 
‗abuse of discretion,‘ but this chameleon phrase is misleading.‖ (internal citation omitted)).  
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certification.
104
 As argued in Part II, a more searching review makes sense 
in certification appeals because so much rides on the outcome.
105
 In 
contrast, denial of a continuance is usually not a pivotal issue and, unlike 
class certification, truly is discretionary, hinging on the court‘s inherent 
power to manage the docket and control proceedings.
106
 Unfortunately, 
from a standard-of-review perspective, appeals of dismissal on FNC are 
treated more like denials of continuances than decisions on class 
certification.
107
  
 
 
 104. Abrams, 719 F.2d at 28. In Abrams, the Second Circuit described this phenomenon at some 
length: 
It is not inconsistent with the discretion standard for an appellate court to decline to honor a 
purported exercise of discretion which was infected by an error of law. Once cases of this sort 
are eliminated, it does no particular harm to say that the district court‘s denial or grant of class 
action status will be reversed only for ―abuse of discretion‖ so long as we understand that this 
standard itself is flexible. See also United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817–19 (3 Cir. 
1981); . . . . Abuse of discretion can be found far more readily on appeals from the denial or 
grant of class action status than where the issue is, for example, the curtailment of cross-
examination or the grant or denial of a continuance. The courts have built a body of case law 
with respect to class action status. See 6 Newberg, CLASS ACTIONS 7–139 (1977 & 1983 
Supp.) (class action decisions checklist). While no two cases will be exactly alike, a court of 
appeals can no more tolerate divergence by a district judge from the principles it has 
developed on this subject than it would under a standard of full review-and this even though 
the district judge has adduced what would be plausible grounds for his ruling if the issue were 
arising for the first time. Except to the extent that the ruling is based on determinations of fact 
and is thus protected by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) or where the trial judge‘s experience in the 
instant case or in similar cases has given him a degree of knowledge superior to that of 
appellate judges, as often occurs, review of class action determinations for ―abuse of 
discretion‖ does not differ greatly from review for error. As the Fourth Circuit has stated in 
another area said to be governed by an abuse of discretion standard, ―[a] judge‘s discretion is 
not boundless and must be exercised within the applicable rules of law or equity.‖ 
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4 Cir. 1977) (Craven, J.); 
see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931–32 (1975); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernhard, 
452 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1981). 
Abrams, 719 F.2d at 30 (internal citations omitted).  
 105. In addition to the high stakes, abuse of discretion review takes on a different form in the class 
certification context because the courts recognize that legal questions inform the analysis. Archdiocese 
of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2010) (―We 
review the district court‘s certification decision for an abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the 
legal standards employed by the district court.‖). Again, we have not seen this recognition in FNC 
appeals.  
 106. But see Fener v. Operating Eng‘r Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009) (―We 
review class certification decisions for abuse of discretion in recognition of the essentially factual basis 
of the certification inquiry and of the district court‘s inherent power to manage and control pending 
litigation.‖).  
 107. Compare Lony v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1989) (―Our 
scope of review in this matter is limited. The motion to grant or deny a forum non conveniens motion 
lies within the sound discretion of the district court.‖), with Holder v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 574 
F.3d 169, 175–76, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing district court‘s duty to conduct a ―rigorous analysis,‖ 
a ―thorough examination,‖ and a ―searching inquiry‖ when determining class certification (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Courts have recognized the importance of class certification decisions 
and adjusted the standard of review accordingly.
108
 Noting the ―awesome 
power‖ wielded by a district court passing on certification, the circuit 
courts have effectively heightened the standard of review to ―abuse-of-
discretion-plus.‖109 The appellate courts instruct the district courts to 
conduct a ―rigorous analysis‖ of the Rule 23 elements,110 and then they 
follow up with an equally rigorous review of the decision below.
111
 
In contrast, the standard of review of FNC dismissals is quite 
deferential.
112
 The statistics below tell the story more powerfully than 
words, but the bottom line is that a district court‘s decision to dismiss a 
case on FNC will only be reversed in the event of an exceedingly ―clear 
abuse of discretion.‖113 In the end, FNC dismissal motions lead to 
―virtually insulate[d] district court determinations.‖114 
 
 
 108. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (―Careful 
application of Rule 23 accords with the pivotal status of class certification in large-scale litigation, 
because ‗denying or granting class certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it 
may sound the ―death knell‖ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to 
settle non-meritorious claims on the part of defendants) . . . .‘‖ (internal citation omitted)). Although 
courts have occasionally articulated the standard as highly deferential, those rulings are few and far 
between. See, e.g., Devai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2009) (―A ruling on 
class certification ‗is subject to a very limited review and will be reversed only upon a strong showing 
that the district court‘s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.‘‖ (citing In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. 
Litig. 213 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
 109. Vega v. T-Mobile, U.S.A., Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 110. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Reeb v. Ohio Dep‘t of Rehab. 
& Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); Chamberlain v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 961 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 111. See, e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(―Thus, in reviewing the District Court‘s decision to certify the class, we must assess whether an 
adequately ‗rigorous analysis‘ was conducted to determine that each of the Rule 23 requirements was 
satisfied.‖); Robinson v. Texas Auto Dealers Ass‘n, 387 F.3d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2004) (―To make a 
determination on class certification, a district court must conduct an intense factual investigation. . . . 
Although we review the certification decision using a deferential standard, ‗[a] district court must 
conduct a rigorous analysis of the rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class.‘‖ (quoting Castano v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996))).  
 112. Rajeev Muttreja, Note, How to Fix the Inconsistent Application of Forum Non Conveniens to 
Latin American Jurisdiction—And Why Consistency May Not Be Enough, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1607, 
1608–09 (2008) (noting that FNC is ―highly discretionary‖ and appellate review ―very deferential‖); 
Paul Santoyo, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal 
Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate Accountability, 27 HOUS. J. INT‘L 
L. 703, 718 (2005) (―The highly deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, coupled with the 
fact that a forum non conveniens determination is decided by the judge who will ultimately hear the 
case if it is not dismissed, makes a foreign plaintiff hard-pressed to find a court receptive to the idea 
that another forum has greater administrative burdens.‖); Greenberg, supra note 10, at 334. 
 113. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).  
 114. Greenberg, supra note 10, at 334 (quoting Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket 
Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL 
L. REV. 650, 682–83 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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B. An Empirical Analysis 
The claim that abuse of discretion review means one thing for FNC 
decisions and another for decisions on class certification is supported by 
empirical evidence. To test my hypothesis, I reviewed nearly 500 federal 
appellate decisions dating back to 1958 and determined average reversal 
rates for the two types of appeals. The results confirm that, statistically 
speaking, appellate panels are considerably more deferential to decisions 
on FNC than they are to decisions on class certification. Whereas district 
court decisions on FNC were affirmed over 74.4% of the time, class 
certification decisions were affirmed at a rate of only 62.7%. Furthermore, 
while the trend in appellate review of class certification decisions is 
decidedly becoming more aggressive—approaching a 50% reversal rate 
since 2007—we see no similar trend in the context of FNC.  
1. The Samples and Results 
a. Decisions on Class Certification  
 i. Methodology 
To gather a comprehensive data pool, I searched Westlaw for all circuit 
court cases, published and unpublished, that included the word ―certify‖ 
(or some variation thereof) within one sentence of ―review‖ (or some 
variation thereof) and within one sentence of ―abuse of discretion.‖115 This 
yielded a total of 567 cases. Of these 567 cases, I identified and excluded 
299 false positives, leaving a total of 268 cases for further analysis.  
In discerning whether to exclude a case, the ultimate question was ―did 
the court actually review a decision on class certification for abuse of 
discretion?‖ If the answer was ―yes,‖ the case was included. If the answer 
was ―no,‖ the case was excluded. I therefore eliminated cases from the 
study where, for instance, the lower court had denied the certification 
motion as moot after dismissing the suit on the merits (and the appellate 
court‘s reversal on the merits made the certification question ripe); where 
the appellate court affirmed the lower court‘s decision denying class 
certification on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a claim; where 
the appellate court affirmed or reversed the district court‘s certification 
decision on grounds of standing; where the issue on appeal was a petition 
 
 
 115. The full search was as follows: ―certif! /s review /s ‗abuse of discretion.‘‖ I ran the search on 
January 8, 2010.  
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for interlocutory review of a decision on class certification (a step 
removed from the Rule 23 abuse of discretion analysis); and where the 
appellate court reviewed the lower court‘s decision to deny a motion for 
class certification as untimely.
116
  
I also excluded cases that, while they may have involved abuse of 
discretion review, did not arise under Rule 23 (e.g., collective action cases 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act). Naturally, I also ignored truly irrelevant cases (e.g., review of a 
decision to certify election results or review of a lower court‘s decision to 
certify a question of law). In the few cases that presented close calls as to 
inclusion versus exclusion, I erred on the side of exclusion.  
 ii. Results 
As the below chart shows, appellate panels affirmed decisions on class 
certification approximately 63% of the time.
117
 For every two cases 
affirmed, at least one was reversed.
118
  
 
 
 116. The review in this final scenario, as in the others, does not qualify as the sort of appellate 
review with which we are concerned. We are concerned with review of decisions on the merits of class 
certification—whether the lower court properly considered the Rule 23 factors—not with decisions on 
whether a motion was timely filed.  
 117. ―Reversals‖ include partial reversals (i.e., where certain aspects of the certification decision 
were affirmed but others reversed). In addition, some of the rulings were reversed because the lower 
court got the law wrong. Arguably, I should have excluded these opinions because legal issues are 
reviewed de novo. See Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (―Nominally, review of 
decisions granting or denying class certification is for ‗abuse of discretion,‘ but this chameleon phrase 
is misleading. Express standards for certification are contained in Rule 23, so an appeal can pose pure 
issues of law reviewed de novo or occasionally raw fact findings that are rarely disturbed.‖ (internal 
citation omitted)). Even though the overall standard of review for a Rule 23 decision is abuse of 
discretion, such an abuse was only identified in these cases by virtue of the lower court‘s incorrect 
description or application of the law. If we took out these opinions, the Rule 23 appellate jurisprudence 
would appear even more deferential.  
 118. The reversed cases are as follows: United Steel v. Conoco Philips Co., 2010 WL 22701 (9th 
Cir. 2010); In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litigation, 589 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2009); Mims v. 
Stewart Title Guarantee Co., 2009 WL 4642631 (5th Cir. 2009); Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 581 
F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Nucor Corp., 
576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009); Nafar v. Hollywood Tanning Sys., Inc., 339 F. App‘x 216 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 574 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Flag Telecom Holdings, 
Ltd., 574 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Wells Fargo Home Mtg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve 
Corp., 572 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Vega v. T-Mobile, U.S.A., Inc., 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 328 F. 
App‘x 121 (3d Cir. 2009); Huberman v. Tag-It Pac., Inc., 314 F. App‘x 59 (9th Cir. 2009); Atwell v. 
Gabow, 2009 WL 294366 (10th Cir. 2009); Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009); 
Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 2009 WL 87510 (6th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. HUD, 554 F.3d 525 
(5th Cir. 2008); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008); Andrews v. 
Chevy Chase, 545 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2008); Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141 
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(3d Cir. 2008); Gene and Gene LLC v. Biopay LLC, 541 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2008); Para v. Bashas, 
Inc., 536 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2008); Robertson v. Monsanto Co., 287 F. App‘x 354 (5th Cir. July 18, 
2008); Sisley v. Sprint Commc’n Co., LP, 284 Fed. Appx. 463 (9th Cir. 2008); Doiron v. Conseco 
Health Ins. Co., 279 Fed. Appx. 313 (5th Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 
(2d Cir. 2008); In re New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008); Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 
513 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2008); Gooden v. Crain, 255 F. App‘x 858 (5th Cir. 2007); Cent. States Se. 
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Merck-Medco., 504 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2007); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless 
Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2007); Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., 502 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2007); Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007); Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); McKenna v. First 
Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007); Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 
F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007); United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271 
(6th Cir. 2007); In re IPO Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Nassau Cty Strip Search 
Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2006); Wachtel ex 
rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2006); Heffner v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006); Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 
188 (4th Cir. 2006); Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2006); In re 
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116 (8th 
Cir. 2005); In re Comm. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 
125 (2d Cir. 2005); Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 
256 (3d Cir. 2004); Robinson v. Texas Auto Dealers Assn., 387 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2004); Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 
2004); Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 353 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2003); Bell v. City of 
Dallas, 81 F.  App‘x 490 (5th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181 
(11th Cir. 2003); Tilley v. TJX Co., Inc., 345 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 
343 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2003); Parker v. Time Warner, 331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003); Smilow v. Sw. Bell 
Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2003); McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545 (5th 
Cir. 2003); O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2003); Molski v. 
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003); Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat. Indem. Ins. Co., 319 
F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2003); Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2002); Heimmermann v. First 
Union Mortg. Corp., 305 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 
F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002); Drayton v. W. 
Auto Supply Co., 2002 WL 32508918 (11th Cir. 2002); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 
2002); Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002); Piazzo v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 273 F.3d 
1341 (11th Cir. 2001); Berger v. Compaq Comp. Corp., 257 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001); Linehart v. 
Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2001); Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust 
Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2001); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807 
(11th Cir. 2001); In re LifeUSA Holding, Inc., 242 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2001); Patterson v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 241 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2001); Consol. Edison Co. v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000); Prado Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 
1266 (11th Cir. 2000); Pederson v. LSU, 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-a-Car 
Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000); Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 
2000); Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., Ltd., 204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000); Pederson v. LSU, 201 
F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000); Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 199 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 
165 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1999); Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207 (6th Cir. 1997); Valentino 
v. Carter Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996); Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 
1996); Alpern v. UtiliCorp. United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525 (8th Cir. 1996); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 
644 (9th Cir. 1995); Baby Neal for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3d Cir. 1994); and Hartman v. 
Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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b. Decisions on Forum Non Conveniens 
 i. Methodology 
To gather the relevant decisions on FNC, I searched Westlaw for all 
circuit court cases, published and unpublished, that contained the phrase 
―forum non conveniens‖ within one sentence of ―review‖ (or any variation 
thereof).
119
 This search yielded 248 cases, less than half the number of 
cases initially identified through the class certification search, though 
about what you would expect given the relative frequency of the two 
issues in appellate practice. From these 248 cases, I subtracted 60 as false 
positives, leaving a denominator of 188.
120
  
 
 
 119. The full search was ―‗forum non conveniens‘ /s review!‖ I performed the search on March 8, 
2011.  
 120. In addition to the fact that motions for class certification are more common than motions to 
Reversed 
37% 
Affirmed 
63% 
Appellate Review of Decisions  
on Class Certification 
Reversed 
Affirmed 
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As with the analysis pertaining to the class certification cases, the 
decision to exclude a case was driven by asking whether the case was 
actually a member of the relevant family. If the appellate court did not rule 
on a district court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss for FNC 
under the rubric of abuse of discretion, the case was excluded. I therefore 
excluded cases reviewing the question of an ―available and adequate 
alternative forum‖ to the extent that question was reviewed de novo.121 
Also excluded were cases where the court reversed for want of jurisdiction 
(and therefore never reached the FNC issue); where the issue on appeal 
was the enforceability of a forum-selection clause; and other false 
positives. As with the other data set, I erred on the side of exclusion in the 
few cases that presented truly close calls.  
 
 
dismiss under FNC, we likely see fewer appellate decisions on the latter topic because denials of FNC 
motions, unlike orders granting them, are not immediately appealable. William L. Reynolds, The 
Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the 
Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1685 (1992); see also Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 769 F.2d 352, 353 (6th Cir. 1985). Although class certification decisions are likewise not 
immediately appealable under Rule 23(f), the Rule at least invites petitions and draws no distinction 
between review of orders granting certification and orders denying certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(f) (―[The] court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 
certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 
days after the order is entered.‖); see also Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 
2005) (―Review of class certification decisions will be most appropriate when . . . there is a death-knell 
situation for either the plaintiff or defendant that is independent of the merits of the underlying claims, 
coupled with a class certification decision by the district court that is questionable . . . .‖). 
 Others have argued, and I would agree, that all FNC decisions should be entitled to immediate 
appellate review. See generally Christina Melady Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non 
Conveniens and Venue Transfer Orders, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715 (1991). At the very least, the 
courts should identify ―death-knell‖ cases and grant immediate review in those situations, as they do in 
the context of class certification appeals. See Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 959. Professor William 
Reynolds has explained the problems with the status quo as follows:  
A dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is a final judgment and therefore an 
immediately appealable order. Denial of a motion to dismiss, in contrast, is not immediately 
appealable because it is not a final order. Pretrial review of that denial, therefore, can only be 
done by the trial court certifying an interlocutory appeal or by petitioning the circuit court for 
a writ of mandamus. Nor is appeal of the denial possible under the collateral order doctrine. It 
is quite possible, therefore, that initial appellate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss for 
forum non conveniens may sometimes follow a trial on the merits. The fact that a trial on the 
merits has already occurred obviously will be relevant on appeal; inconvenience will be much 
harder to demonstrate once the trial has been held. One court ruled that the trial bolsters the 
denial, and that the defendant must show that she was greatly prejudiced by having had her 
day in court in the plaintiff‘s forum.  
Reynolds, supra note 96, at 1685 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 121. See, e.g., DRFP L.L.C. v. Republica Bolivariana de Venez., 622 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 
2010). The courts have been inconsistent on this point by sometimes using the abuse of discretion 
standard and other times reviewing de novo. Compare id., with Overseas Media, Inc. v. Skvortsov, 277 
F. App‘x 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion review), and Kinney v. Occidental Oil & Gas 
Corp., 109 F. App‘x 135 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).  
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On the other hand, I did not exclude—and indeed counted in the 
affirmative—cases where the only error identified by the appellate court 
was failure to include a return-jurisdiction clause.
122
 In these instances, the 
appellate panel found no abuse of discretion, and therefore upheld the 
dismissal itself, but simply remanded for inclusion of a return-jurisdiction 
clause. 
 ii. Results 
In contrast to the rate of affirmance we see in the context of class 
certification (approximately 63%), circuit courts affirmed decisions on 
FNC some 74% of the time. For every three FNC cases they affirmed, 
appellate panels reversed only one.
123
 
 
 
 122. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003); Crystal Co. v. 
Inchcape Shipping Servs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1999). A return-jurisdiction clause is a tool 
used by U.S. courts to protect against the possibility that the foreign court will not accept the case or 
that the defendant will refuse to cooperate in the alternative forum. In that instance, the return-
jurisdiction clause—a clause added by the U.S. court to its order of dismissal—allows the plaintiff to 
re-file the case in the original U.S. forum. See Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications, Inc., 117 
F.3d 900, 907–08 (5th Cir. 1997).  
 123. The reversed cases are as follows: Zions First Nat. Bank v. Moto Diesel Mexicana, S.A. de 
C.V., 629 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2010); Cariajano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2010); Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Island Seas Invs., Ltd., 590 F.3d 
126 (11th Cir. 2009); Boston Telecomm. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); Zelaya v. 
De Zelaya, 250 F. App‘x 943 (11th Cir. 2007); Fid. Bank PLC v. N. Fox Shipping N.V., 242 F. App‘x 
84 (4th Cir. 2007); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2006); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 
F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006); Tech. Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Onischenko, 174 F. App‘x 117 (3d Cir. 2006); In re 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2005); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 
416 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2005); SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 
1097 (11th Cir. 2004); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 F. App‘x 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Ford v. Brown, 319 
F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003); Nemariam v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., 315 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Triflo Med., Inc. v. Lapeyre, 44 F. App‘x 266 (9th Cir. 2002); DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 
294 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2002); Alnwick v. European Micro Holdings, Inc., 29 F. App‘x 781 (2d Cir. 
2002); Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Bank of Credit & Commerce Int’l 
Ltd. v. State Bank of Pak., 273 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2001); DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 232 F.3d 49 
(2d Cir. 2000); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 203 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2000); Alpha 
Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai, 199 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1999); Rankine v. Rankine, 166 
F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998) (Table); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Raytheon Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc. v. H L H & Assocs. Inc., 142 F.3d 
1279 (5th Cir. 1998); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996); CTF Cent. Corp. 
v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 1995); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. 
Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 1993); Ceramic Corp. of America v. Inka Maritime Corp. 
Inc., 1 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1993); Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540 (5th Cir. 1991); Lony v. 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1991); Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390 
(8th Cir. 1991); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1991); Hotvedt v. Schlumberger 
Ltd., 914 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1990); Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 886 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 
1989); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988); Schexnider v. McDermott Intern., 
Inc., 817 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987); McClelland Eng’rs, Inc. v. Munusamy, 784 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 
1986); Nicol v. Gulf Fleet Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Gates Learjet Corp. v. 
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2. Conclusions Drawn and Other Observations 
Based on statistical analysis of the jurisprudence—going back to 1994 
in the case of class certification decisions and 1958 in the context of 
decisions on FNC, it is apparent that circuit courts afford more deference 
to decisions on FNC than they do to decisions on class certification. This 
would not be remarkable in other circumstances, but it is when we 
consider that the two types of decisions are effectively outcome-
determinative and that they are both ostensibly reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. 
 
 
Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984); Irish Nat. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 
(2d Cir. 1984); DeShane v. Deere & Co., 726 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1984); De Oliveira v. Delta Marine 
Drilling Co., 707 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1983); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962); and Caspar v. Devine, 
257 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
Reversed 
26% 
Affirmed 
74% 
Appellate Review of Decisions  
on Forum Non Conveniens 
Reversed 
Affirmed 
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Beyond the sheer numbers, the content and shape of the decisions show 
that the statistical divergence is not mere happenstance. First, several of 
the decisions affirming district court rulings on FNC come in the form of 
―summary orders‖ or short per curiam orders.124 This is not the case when 
it comes to class certification appeals. Those opinions are generally 
lengthier, with the court spelling out its reasoning in some detail. I do not 
suggest that the length of an opinion necessarily reflects the amount of 
thought that went into it or the legitimacy of the ultimate decision, but 
rather the number and tone of the summary and per curiam orders does 
suggest that the courts are less willing to expend judicial resources on 
FNC disputes.
125
 Abuse of discretion review is a handy tool to avoid in-
depth analysis, or at least the articulation of such analysis. Rather than 
indicating exactly how the lower court got it right or wrong, the reviewing 
court can simply state, ―we find no abuse of discretion.‖  
Second, although both types of rulings are ostensibly reviewed for 
―abuse of discretion,‖ the appellate courts occasionally hint at differing 
standards through modifying language. It does not occur with enough 
frequency to conclude that the judiciary, as an institution, has officially 
recognized the distinction. (In fact, I haven‘t seen a single opinion that 
explicitly recognizes, let alone endorses, the differing standards of review 
that I believe we see in practice.) Yet the modifying language does imply 
that some appellate panels are aware that they apply a more deferential 
standard in the case of decisions on FNC. For instance, many of the FNC 
cases say the discretion afforded to district courts is ―substantial.‖126 We 
also see courts defining the standard as review not just for any abuse of 
 
 
 124. See, e.g., Seales v. Panamanian Aviation Co. 356 F. App‘x 461 (2d Cir. 2009); Moss v. 
Tiberon Minerals Ltd., 334 F. App‘x 116 (9th Cir. 2009); DTEX, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 508 
F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2007); Lisa, S.A. v. Gutierrez  Mayorga, 240 F. App‘x 822, *1 (11th Cir. 2007); 
ICC Indus. Inc. v. Isr. Discount Bank, Ltd., 170 F. App‘x 766 (2d Cir. 2006); Moskovits v. Moskovits, 
150 F. App‘x 101 (2d Cir. 2005); Kinney v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., 109 F. App‘x 135 (9th Cir. 
2004); Base Metal Trading Ltd. v. Russian Aluminum, 98 F. App‘x 47 (2d Cir. 2004); Rivera v. 
Hewlett Packard Corp., 95 F. App‘x 241 (9th Cir. 2004) (only nine sentences); Dattner v. Conagra 
Foods, Inc., 91 F. App‘x 179 (2d Cir. 2004); Entercolor Tech. Corp. v. Kabushiki Kaisha, 41 F. App‘x 
976 (9th Cir. 2002) (only five sentences).  
 125. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 
787, 799 (2012) (discussing the relative weight of published versus unpublished opinions and the fact 
that, through publication, the ―original panel . . . decides the precedential weight of its opinion . . . .‖); 
Fonseca v. Consol. Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2001) (―[U]npublished opinions are never 
controlling authority.‖). Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 now prohibits courts from 
limiting citation to unpublished opinions, the rule has no effect on the prudential value of such 
decisions. See F.R.A.P. 32.1 Advisory Committee Note; see also, e.g., United States v. Harris, 416 F. 
App‘x 768 (10th Cir. 2011).  
 126. See, e.g., Lisa, S.A. v. Gutierrez Mayorga, 240 F. App‘x 822, 823 (11th Cir. 2007).  
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discretion, but for a ―clear abuse of discretion.‖127 Significantly, we don‘t 
see this sort of language in the class certification precedent.  
On the flip side of the coin, appellate courts have frequently suggested 
that the standard of review pertaining to certification decisions is more 
demanding than normal. First, class certification is taken more seriously 
from the beginning, with district courts conducting a ―rigorous‖ analysis 
of the Rule 23 factors.
128
 Because the stakes are so high, district courts are 
instructed to be especially careful in applying the law.
129
 If the lower court 
fails to approach the dispute with adequate rigor, the appellate court may 
reverse on that basis alone. And the appellate courts have made it quite 
clear that they are on the lookout for error; this is not a passive review.  
The practical effect of Rule 23‘s requirements is a type of review 
that borders on de novo, and certainly, if an appellate court believes 
that certification has been improvidently granted, it generally will 
have no difficulty finding that a trial court has abused its discretion 
or departed from the essential requirements of law.
130
  
 
 
 127. See, e.g., Venture Global Eng‘g, L.L.C. v. Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd., 233 F. App‘x 517, 
520 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2006); Pollux 
Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2003); SSI Corp. v. Matsuda, 175 F. 
App‘x 168, 169 (9th Cir. 2006) (―We review the district court‘s dismissal narrowly for a clear abuse of 
discretion.‖); Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d 
Cir. 2002). A district court‘s ―decision to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens ‗lies 
wholly within the broad discretion of the district court and may be overturned only when we believe 
that discretion has been clearly abused.‘‖ Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Scottish Air Int‘l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1232 (2d Cir. 
1996)). The court‘s review of a district court‘s decision to dismiss an action pursuant to forum non 
conveniens is ―extremely limited.‖ Peregrine Myan. Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996). It 
may reverse ―only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.‖ See Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk 
Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). ―There can be a clear abuse of 
discretion only if a court fails to carefully consider the Gilbert factors.‖ Peregrine, 89 F.3d at 46 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. JSC Lieutuvos Energija, 166 F.3d 
1201, *1 (2d Cir. 1998) (table case).  
 128. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); Reeb v. Ohio Dep‘t of Rehab. 
& Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); Chamberlain v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 961 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 129. See, e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litigation, 589 F.3d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(―Thus, in reviewing the District Court‘s decision to certify the class, we must assess whether an 
adequately ‗rigorous analysis‘ was conducted to determine that each of the Rule 23 requirements was 
satisfied.‖); Robinson v. Tex. Auto Dealers Ass‘n, 387 F.3d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2004) (―To make a 
determination on class certification, a district court must conduct an intense factual investigation. . . . 
Although we review the certification decision using a deferential standard, ‗[a] district court must 
conduct a rigorous analysis of the rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class.‘‖ (quoting Castano v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1996))). 
 130. Markham R. Leventhal, Class Actions: Fundamentals of Certification Analysis, 72 FLA. BAR 
J. 10, 16 (May 1998). 
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In the instance of a settlement class, the jurisprudence is even more 
explicit. As the Supreme Court stated in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor, aspects of Rule 23 ―demand undiluted, even heightened, 
attention in the settlement context.‖131  
In sum, the statistics confirm what the substance of the jurisprudence 
implies: although both categories of decisions are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, appellate courts are significantly more deferential in the context 
of FNC rulings than they are in the context of class certification decisions.  
IV. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT APPELLATE REVIEW OF FNC AND CLASS 
CERTIFICATION RULINGS 
Because FNC analysis involves a stew of factors,
132
 abuse of discretion 
review is, if not clearly appropriate, in keeping with standard-of-review 
jurisprudence.
133
 When lower courts are asked to balance factors, appellate 
courts generally extend some degree of deference to the manner in which 
the lower courts strike that balance. But if abuse of discretion review is to 
be meaningful, appellate courts must avoid using it as a ―rubber stamp‖ to 
affirm lower courts and instead perform their review in a manner that truly 
tests or challenges the discretion the lower court used, especially for case-
dispositive rulings. Courts have recognized a need for this level of review 
when it comes to class certification. They should do the same with respect 
to FNC.  
As things currently stand, the broad discretion inherent in FNC and the 
lenient standard of appellate review work to invite shaky rulings by district 
courts and improvident affirmances by their appellate counterparts.
134
 It 
bears repeating that FNC dismissals are supposed to be the exception, not 
the rule.
135
 The statistics, unfortunately, show that this is not the case in 
 
 
 131. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997); see also Linney v. Cellular 
Alaska P‘ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing the Amchem language in support of stricter 
standard of review).  
 132. Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 133. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (―The forum non conveniens 
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and 
private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves 
substantial deference.‖). 
 134. Leah B. Moon, Comment, Should They Stay or Should They Go: Applying the Forum Non 
Conveniens Doctrine to Foreign Plaintiffs Injured Abroad in Abad v. Bayer Corporation, 5 SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
 135. The ―doctrine of forum non conveniens proceed[s] from [the] premise [that] . . . [i]n rare 
circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.‖ Quackenbush 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
560 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:527 
 
 
 
 
practice.
136
 When district courts are granting it over 50% of FNC motions 
to dismiss
137
 and appellate panels are affirming district court decisions on 
these motions at a clip of nearly 75%,
138
 something is wrong. Certainly, 
the terms of the doctrine itself need some revision. As Justice Scalia put it, 
―[t]he discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the 
multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application . . . make 
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.‖139 But that is 
not all that is wrong—nor is that the focus of this Article.  
Rather than calling for a rewriting of the doctrine, I make the modest 
proposal that the appellate courts recognize the high stakes of the issue 
and apply an appropriate standard of review. There is no need to change 
the standard itself—at least not in any radical way—but reviewing courts 
must apply it with more vigor by searching out and correcting error where 
reasonable minds could not differ.  
The courts have shown that the abuse of discretion standard is equal to 
the task. In the context of class certification appeals, appellate courts have 
not let the standard of review stop them from examining the lower courts‘ 
decisions with meaningful scrutiny.
140
 They do, in fact, review for an 
abuse of discretion—re-examining the record and the lower court‘s 
analysis in light thereof—and do not hesitate to reverse when they 
perceive an error.
141
 It is the difference between skimming a novel and 
saying it seems well written, and actually reading every line and then 
drawing a conclusion. The ultimate question may be the same, but the 
study and thought that goes into it makes all the difference.  
The status quo for FNC appeals—overbroad discretion coupled with 
lenient appellate review—is not acceptable. Perhaps there was a time 
when we could claim ignorance, when we could pretend that an FNC 
dismissal was not effectively case-dispositive. That time has long since 
passed.
142
 It is a well-known fact that when a foreign plaintiff decides to 
sue in U.S. court, she usually has no fall-back option.
143
 Unless we are 
 
 
 136. See Lii, supra note 67, at 526 (2009); see also supra Part III.B.  
 137. Lii, supra note 67, at 526.  
 138. Supra Part III.B.2. 
 139. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (internal reference omitted).  
 140. See In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litigation, 589 F.3d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Robinson v. Tex. Auto Dealers Ass‘n, 387 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2004); Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 
F.2d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 141. See Leventhal, supra note 130, at 16. 
 142. See generally Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England, supra note 73, at 
420; Robertson & Speck, supra note 86, at 938; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 334.  
 143. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., 
concurring) (―A forum non conveniens dismissal usually will end the litigation altogether, effectively 
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prepared to say that these cases categorically lack merit, we must 
acknowledge the gravity of FNC decisions and the consequences they bear 
for foreign plaintiffs. One way to make such an acknowledgement is 
through an appropriate standard of appellate review. By ratcheting up the 
standard to something like ―abuse-of-discretion-plus,‖ the judiciary would 
send the message, to lower courts, litigants, and the population at large, 
that it understands the seriousness of FNC in today‘s world.144  
So why not do this? Why shouldn‘t FNC rulings be treated like class 
certification rulings when they come up for appellate review? Some will 
say that the reason for the disparate reversal rates are not due to a 
difference in the standard of review, but due to the nature of the predicate 
law; FNC doctrine, they might argue, clearly favors dismissal in most 
cases.
145
 Class certification law is much more equivocal—sometimes it 
suggests certification, sometimes it does not. District courts just follow the 
trends, and it is no surprise that we see more reversals in an area of law 
that is more equivocal (class certification) than in an area of law that 
predominantly points to but one conclusion (FNC).  
I would offer two rejoinders. First, FNC, in its fundamental contours, 
does not favor dismissal in the vast majority of cases. As the Supreme 
Court has held, the ―doctrine of forum non conveniens proceed[s] from 
[the] premise [that] . . . [i]n rare circumstances, federal courts can 
relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.‖146 The fact that the 
Supreme Court has also instructed trial courts to grant less deference to a 
foreign plaintiff‘s forum choice does not mean that courts should approach 
these situations with a presumption of dismissal. ―[T]his reduced weight is 
not an invitation to accord a foreign plaintiff‘s selection of an American 
 
 
excusing any liability of the defendant.‖).  
 144. In addition to the injustice suffered by parties as a result of the mismatch between the gravity 
of FNC decisions and the standard of appellate review, the current situation casts the U.S. judiciary in 
an unfavorable light upon the world stage. FNC too often produces results that smack of nativism and 
economic protectionism. See RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: 
HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS 129 (2007) (―Such results have spurred a deeper criticism: that application of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine is used to protect U.S. corporations from liability for harm caused in Latin 
America.‖). Even if the underlying goal of FNC—dismissing suits from U.S. court when they could be 
litigated elsewhere more efficiently—is laudable, it is too often misapplied. Stricter appellate review is 
one tool that can curb abuse and ensure that FNC is not simply an instrument of prejudice against 
foreign plaintiffs.  
 145. See Lii, supra note 67, at 526 (observing that courts have granted the majority of FNC 
motions filed since 1982). Of course, citing the statistics in this instance simply begs the question.  
 146. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996). 
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forum no deference since dismissal for forum non conveniens is the 
exception rather than the rule.‖147  
Second, if the first point is not convincing—if FNC should favor 
dismissal so frequently—what harm will come from a more rigorous 
review? The only downside is the expenditure of appellate resources. This 
is not a cost that can be lightly dismissed, but it is a cost that is justified 
when one considers the serious consequences of decisions on FNC.
148
  
Finally, the movement towards heightened review should cut both 
ways.
149
 Although most of the literature on the gravity of FNC decisions 
deals with the impact on the plaintiff, these rulings are also tremendously 
important to defendants. All litigants in U.S. court, no matter their 
resources, deserve appellate review commensurate with the weight of the 
issue.  
CONCLUSION 
It is a basic tenet of judicial fairness that similar cases ought to receive 
similar treatment.
150
 Although the substantive issues at play in FNC and 
class certification disputes are admittedly different, the two categories of 
cases are strikingly similar in terms of the attributes that should inform the 
standard of appellate review. Whether ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
FNC or a motion to certify a class under Rule 23, a district court must 
consider a number of factors, including considerations of judicial 
economy, fairness, and efficiency for the parties. The doctrine of FNC and 
 
 
 147. R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Lacey v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 45–46 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 148. Critics of my proposal might also argue that FNC dismissals can be made contingent on 
acceptance of litigation by a foreign court (i.e., through inclusion of a ―return-jurisdiction clause‖). 
See, e.g., USHA (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int‘l, Inc., 421 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2005); Vasquez v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003). This practice presents problems. On the one 
hand, it is a helpful development because it tries to ensure that the case will be heard somewhere. On 
the other hand, courts can use it as a crutch for dismissals in borderline cases. It becomes another 
(improperly placed) thumb on the scale favoring dismissal. A court that does not wish to engage in a 
full analysis of the available-and-adequate-forum question can comfort itself with the thought that the 
litigants can return to U.S. court if it does not work out abroad. Thus, the return-jurisdiction clause 
becomes something of a moral hazard.  
 149. This should also be the case with respect to appellate review of class certification decisions, 
i.e., the standard of review should be the same whether certification was granted or denied. Most 
courts seem to follow through on this idea. The Second Circuit has stated, however, that its review of a 
denial of class certification is ―noticeably less deferential . . . when [the district] court has denied class 
status than when it has certified a class.‖ Parker v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999)) (omissions 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This approach is troubling, especially because the 
Second Circuit has offered little in the way of explanation for this disparate treatment.  
 150. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
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the terms of Rule 23 both aim to achieve efficiency and fairness in 
litigation—whether that means litigating the case in another country or 
consolidating numerous individual claims in a single class action—and it 
is the trial court‘s job to discern how best that might be achieved. 
Although debatable, abuse of discretion review is probably the appropriate 
standard in both instances.  
But, as we have seen, review for abuse of discretion can mean different 
things in different contexts. The chameleon-like nature of this standard is 
perhaps one of its strengths. If resolution of the underlying dispute 
requires more or less discretion on the part of the district judge, such as 
granting a trial continuance versus applying the specific language of a 
codified rule,
151
 the standard of appellate review should vary accordingly.  
By the same token, however, the standard of review should not vary 
when the disputes, for purposes of appellate review, are more alike than 
different. The judiciary has recognized that the abuse of discretion 
standard should bear teeth in the context of class certification appeals. The 
stakes demand it; whether the lower court rules in favor of or against class 
certification, the ruling is frequently case-dispositive. Appellate review 
must therefore be searching and aggressive to correct erroneous decisions.  
The very same rationale applies in the case of decisions on FNC. If a 
foreign plaintiff is denied access to a U.S. court, the show is often over. 
The economics does not make sense, and the case simply disappears or 
settles for a pittance. And if a U.S. defendant loses on a motion to dismiss 
for FNC, it comes to the bargaining table with its main ammunition spent. 
The plaintiff can then force a settlement or otherwise push the litigation 
further than it merits. In other words, granted or denied, the outcome of an 
FNC motion is usually case-dispositive to the same extent as a motion for 
class certification.  
The doctrine of FNC has been criticized—at times, rightly so—as 
anachronistic. However, I am not prepared to take the position that it 
should be abolished altogether. When FNC achieves its end—directing 
cases to the fairest and most convenient forum—it is a doctrine to be 
lauded. Unfortunately, it is also a doctrine subject to abuse, and when 
district courts make the wrong call, the consequences can be grave. In the 
worst cases, victims of international torts by U.S. companies are 
effectively denied access to justice. Even if some cases should be screened 
from U.S. courts, a faulty choice in the FNC context can paint the court as 
lazy or, worse, as improperly siding with domestic defendants. Appellate 
 
 
 151. The discretion inherent in the balancing under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 comes to mind. 
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review may not be a panacea, but it can go a long way in correcting this 
trend. Because the stakes are so high, abuse of discretion review should be 
applied with heightened scrutiny, just as it is for class certifications. 
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